Basic path traversal payloads (../ directory traversal)
Basic path traversal payloads abuse a parameter that is concatenated into a file path so that ../ (or ..\ on Windows) sequences walk up out of the intended directory and read arbitrary files such as /etc/passwd. This is the root of every Local File Inclusion bug: the application trusts attacker input to build a path.
How it works
A vulnerable endpoint takes a filename from the request (for example ?page=home or ?file=report.pdf) and joins it onto a base directory before opening it. If the value is used without resolving and validating the final path, an attacker can prepend ../ segments to climb above the base directory.
Each ../ (dot-dot-slash) moves one level up the tree. Enough of them reach the filesystem root, after which an absolute-looking suffix selects any readable file. On Windows the separator is a backslash, so ..\ is equivalent, and most Windows APIs accept forward slashes too.
Because the climb stops at the root — extra ../ sequences past / are harmless — attackers usually over-count (../../../../../../) to avoid having to know the exact depth of the base directory.
When it works and when it fails
Works when
- User input is concatenated into a path and the result is never canonicalized or checked against an allowlist.
- The process has read permission on the target file (web-server user can usually read /etc/passwd, app config, source).
- No WAF or input filter strips or rejects ../ sequences.
Fails when
- The app resolves the path (realpath/normalize) and verifies it stays within the base directory.
- Input is mapped through an allowlist of known keys instead of used as a path.
- A forced extension is appended and not truncated (see extension-filter-bypass), so only a fixed file type can be opened.
Representative payloads
Adapt these to your authorized target; they are shown in canonical form. Payloads are never translated.
../../../../../../etc/passwdLinux / UnixNo filterClassic Unix proof of concept. Over-counts ../ to reach the root regardless of base-directory depth, then reads the world-readable account list.
..\..\..\..\..\..\windows\system32\drivers\etc\hostsWindowsNo filterWindows equivalent using backslashes to reach a world-readable file that confirms traversal on Windows hosts.
../../../../../../windows/win.iniWindowsNo filterWindows accepts forward slashes in most path APIs, so Unix-style ../ often works against Windows targets too.
../../config/database.phpAny OSNo filterShallow traversal to an application config one or two directories above the web root — often higher value than /etc/passwd.
Note: Use php://filter to read PHP source without execution — see the PHP filter wrapper technique.
Detection
In logs
- Request paths or query strings containing ../, ..%2f, or ..\ — grep access logs for the literal and encoded forms.
- Requests that reference sensitive filenames (passwd, shadow, web.config, .env, id_rsa) in any parameter.
- A spike of 200/403 responses on a single file parameter from one source — bracketing the base-directory depth.
In code
- File APIs (fopen, file_get_contents, open, fs.readFile, include/require) whose path argument derives from request data.
- Path building with string concatenation or join() where one component is user-controlled.
- Absence of a realpath/normalize call followed by a prefix check before the file is opened.
Detection rule: A Sigma/WAF rule matching (\.\./){2,} or its URL-encoded variants in request parameters catches the naive form; pair it with canonicalization server-side rather than relying on the rule alone.
Remediation
- Do not build file paths from user input. Map a request key to a fixed path through a server-side allowlist (e.g. {"home": "home.html"}) and reject anything not in the map.
- If a path component is unavoidable, resolve the final path (realpath in PHP, Path.resolve/normalize in Node, os.path.realpath in Python) and verify it starts with the intended base directory before opening it.
- Reject input containing path separators or .. outright when the parameter should be a bare filename; validate against a strict pattern such as ^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$.
- Run the application as a low-privilege user and use filesystem permissions / chroot / containers so even a successful traversal reaches nothing sensitive.
Vulnerable (php)
$base = '/var/www/pages/';
$file = $base . $_GET['page'];
readfile($file); // ?page=../../../../etc/passwdFixed
$base = '/var/www/pages/';
$path = realpath($base . $_GET['page']);
if ($path === false || !str_starts_with($path, $base)) {
http_response_code(400);
exit('Invalid path');
}
readfile($path);Resolve the final path and confirm it stays inside the base directory before reading.
FAQ
- Why do payloads use so many ../ sequences?
- Climbing stops at the filesystem root, so extra ../ past the root are ignored. Over-counting means the attacker does not need to know the exact depth of the base directory for the payload to reach /.
- Is path traversal the same as Local File Inclusion?
- Traversal is the mechanism that selects a file outside the intended directory. When the selected file is then included/executed (as with PHP include), traversal becomes Local File Inclusion, which can escalate to code execution.