PHP filter chain RCE (code execution with no writable file)
PHP filter chain RCE abuses php://filter's ability to apply many conversion filters in sequence: by chaining iconv character-set conversions, an attacker makes the wrapper generate arbitrary bytes — a full PHP payload — entirely in memory, so include executes it with no writable file or log needed. It is the modern, config-light path from LFI to remote code execution.
How it works
php://filter can apply a list of filters to a resource. Certain iconv conversions both transform and prepend predictable bytes. By stacking hundreds of carefully ordered conversions, the output can be coerced to begin with attacker-chosen bytes.
A tool (the public php_filter_chain_generator) computes the exact sequence of convert.iconv.* steps that, applied to a trivial base resource, produce a chosen string such as <?php system($_GET[0]);?>. include then executes that generated content.
The key advantage over log poisoning or session inclusion: it needs no file the attacker can write, no known path, and no allow_url_include — only that user input reaches include/require and the iconv filters are available. The payloads are very long chains of convert.iconv.XXX.YYY steps.
When it works and when it fails
Works when
- User input reaches include/require and the php://filter wrapper with convert.iconv.* filters is available.
- iconv support is compiled in (the common default).
- No allowlist constrains the include target.
Fails when
- The php:// wrapper or convert.iconv filters are disabled.
- Input is resolved through an allowlist so no filter string reaches include.
- iconv is unavailable, or the include context is tightly sandboxed.
Representative payloads
Adapt these to your authorized target; they are shown in canonical form. Payloads are never translated.
php://filter/convert.iconv.UTF8.CSISO2022KR|convert.base64-encode|convert.iconv.UTF8.UTF7|…/resource=php://tempAny OSPHP wrapperShape of a filter chain: dozens-to-hundreds of convert.iconv.* steps feeding a base resource. The full chain is machine-generated to emit a chosen PHP string.
Note: Generate the complete chain with the public php_filter_chain_generator against your authorized target; it is too long to list verbatim.
resource=php://tempAny OSPHP wrapperThe trivial base resource the chain operates on; the generated iconv steps build the payload bytes from it.
<?php system($_GET[0]);?>Any OSPHP wrapperThe PHP string a chain is typically built to produce; once include runs it, ?0=id executes commands.
Detection
In logs
- Very long php://filter parameters containing many convert.iconv.* segments separated by |.
- resource=php://temp or resource=data:// at the end of a long filter chain.
- Unusually large request URLs/parameters directed at a page/file endpoint.
In code
- User input reaching include/require at all — the precondition for the whole class.
- No allowlist between the request and the included path.
- php://filter reachable for include contexts with iconv filters enabled.
Detection rule: Alert on php://filter parameters containing multiple convert.iconv. segments or exceeding a length threshold; the filter-chain signature is distinctive.
Remediation
- Never pass user input to include/require; map a request key through an allowlist to a fixed local file. This defeats filter chains along with every other wrapper trick.
- Disable the php:// wrapper (or at least convert.iconv/convert.* filters) for code paths that must take dynamic input.
- Reject any input containing a URL scheme or the pipe character used to chain filters.
- Keep least-privilege execution and disable_functions so that even successful code execution is contained.
Vulnerable (php)
include($_GET['page']); // php://filter/convert.iconv...|...Fixed
$pages = ['home' => 'home.php', 'blog' => 'blog.php'];
$key = (string) ($_GET['page'] ?? 'home');
if (!isset($pages[$key])) { http_response_code(404); exit; }
include __DIR__ . '/pages/' . $pages[$key];Because the chain must reach include, an allowlist that never passes user input to include removes it.
FAQ
- Why is filter-chain RCE so powerful compared with log poisoning?
- It needs no writable file, no known file path, and not even allow_url_include — only that user input reaches include and iconv filters exist. The payload is generated entirely in memory by the conversion chain.